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[Vol. 1979:843 State rulesmakers have almost universally caught the obvious inapplicability of such federal-only sections and omitted them from the counterpart state rules. 6 The federalist influence on the Federal Rules, though, can appear in other ways, and at times it may be so subtle as to escape the attention of the drafters of state rules. A draftsman may be quite aware of a federalist nuance, of course, and still choose to make the state rule a carbon copy of its federal model. Uniformity might, for example, be so highly valued as to outweigh the possible reasons for departing from the federal phrasing. 7 It seems best, however, for the state rulesmakers to make these decisions with full awareness of their implications rather than by default and in ignorance of the sometimes exclusively federalist considerations that influenced their federal counterparts.
At other times, the federalist influence may be apparent enough, yet policy considerations independent of any uniquely federal goals may support the same or a similar approach.' In such situations, there can be a danger that state rulesmakers will perceive only the federal factor and diverge from the federal phrasing, though a fuller understanding of the rationales for a Federal Rule might lead to its adoption in order to further the independent purpose also served by the federal approach.
The purpose of this short Comment is to call attention to the general problem of the federalist overtones in some of the Federal Rules and to offer some concrete illustrations in different areas of civil practice. 9 My aim is neither to derail the practice of tracking the Federal clusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction"); FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
6. But see UTAH R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("In a derivative action. . . the complaint. . . shall allege (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have").
7. See highly objectionable to Arizona whose committee unanimously voted to oppose each of these changes in the federal rules ... We were thus brought up to the precise difficult point: would we rather be uniform than right? The issue was comprehensively debated within the procedure committee... and the almost unanimous conclusion was reached that we preferred uniformity to having our own way even about our own rules. We adopted Rule 19 and the Rule 23 changes because, more than anything else, we want one procedural system. 8. See text accompanying notes 51-64 infra (possible functional, nonfederal reasons, in addition to reasons applicable only in federal system, for requiring derivative action plaintiff to have been stockholder at time of complained-of conduct, and requiring movant for judgment notwithstanding verdict to have sought directed verdict before jury's retirement).
9. There are additional problems in the adaptation of the Federal Rules to state practice that this Comment does not address, such as the possibility of retaining an established state practice congenial to the local bar but simply not preferred by the federal rulesmakers for the federal Rules nor to imply that there are always subtle or "hidden" reasons for state rules to follow the federal model. It is, rather, simply to facilitate closer attention to the twin dangers of uncritical uniformity and uninformed variation so that the states' rules can best serve the states' needs. The federal rulesmakers' response to this dilemma was a rather exquisite piece of waffling. Rule 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." That language might sound as if it adopts the filing-is-tolling approach; but the original Advisory Committee recognized, and took no position on, the key question whether under the rule "the mere filing of the complaint stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such as, service of the summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal for service."'"
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS: TOLLING OF STATUTES
The complexities that make the Federal Rule's equivocation un- § 60-203 (1976) ("A civil action is commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court, provided service of process is obtained ... within ninety (90) days after the petition is filed; otherwise the action is deemed commenced at the time of service of process"). Another approach is for a state to regard its Rule 3 counterpart as treating only the manner, as opposed to the time, of commencement and to address the latter question separately by [Vol. 1979:843 'but others have followed the federal phrasing with no apparent indication whether their product is meant to address the issue or not.' s At the least, state drafters should consider whether they have the authority to determine policy in this area or whether they must leave the problem to the legislature. Those with authority to make policy, or able simply to codify existing policy, would do well to consider being more precise than the federal rulesmakers in their language and more explicit about the import of the state rule.
A closely related problem arises when complaints are amended to change defendants. Whether such amendments relate back to the date of the original pleading can be crucial when the original pleading satisfied limitations requirements but the amendment is offered too late to allow a completely new filing. Logically, a filing-is-tolling state could let good faith party-change amendments relate back, since even a properly named defendant in such a state might not receive service and notice until well after the limitations period had run. 9 A service-istolling state, on the other hand, would presumably insist that the defendant to be added have knowledge of the complaint within the limitations period, since if properly named from the beginning he should have had notice before the statutory cutoff date. Again, for the same reasons that apply in connection with Rule 3, it does not seem possible for the federal rulesmakers to please everybody.
By a 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c), however, the federal drafters did take what seemed to be a clear position in favor of requiring notice within the limitations period:
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if [the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading] and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. If read as requiring notice before the statutory period runs out, this phrasing avoids conflict with the policy of those states requiring service legislation. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-79); 1 R. FIELD § 3.2, at 15 (Supp. 1977).
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See, e.g., ARIz. R. Cir. P. 3. 19. See, e.g., MAss. R. Civ. P. 15(c) ("Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment (including an amendment changing a party) relates back to the original pleading"). Vol. 1979:843] within the limitations period, thus making unnecessary a decision whether the federal or state rule should prevail. The language conflicts, however, with the policies of states following a more liberal approach to party-change amendments. 20 The response of the federal courts to these complexities has compounded the problem. The First Circuit, still smarting from its reversal by the Supreme Court in Hanna v. Plumer, 2 1 has held the Federal Rule inapplicable when it would forbid relation back permitted by a more liberal Massachusetts rule. 2 The Third Circuit, agreeing with the First and others 23 that Federal Rule 15(c) requires notice before the expiration of the statutory period, has held that the Federal Rule prevails over New Jersey's liberal policy on relation back in cases involving complaints originally naming "John Doe" defendants. 24 The Second Circuit has avoided the clash by interpreting Rule 15(c)'s requirement that the party to be added by amendment must receive notice "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him" to extend the time for notice beyond the limitations period itself, taking in any period after the required filing date that state law allows for service. 25 This combination of uncertainty in interpretation and possible conflict with state policies makes the federal phrasing of dubious value to the states. Nonetheless, the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) has been widely incorporated into state rules, even in states that espouse the liberal filing-is-tolling approach. 26 The state rulesmakers apparently have not realized that the federal language, if strictly interpreted, subverts their liberal policy by requiring that notice be given to a wrongly Taken together, Federal Rules 3 and 15(c) seem inappropriate for virtually any state, whatever approaches it wishes to take to tolling of limitations and relation back. The most obvious readings of the federal language are that commencing is filing is tolling, and that to allow relation back of party-change amendments, the party to be added must have received notice within the statutory period without any of the extensions for service of process that may be allowed in cases of proper initial naming. Such readings produce an inconsistent policy permitting extensions of time for initial service but not for relation back; yet the two situations do not seem materially different. To avoid these difficulties, a state supreme court would have to perform considerable plastic surgery to bring fully borrowed rules into line with a state's policies. Such state interpretations would probably have to differ at least in part from prevailing federal interpretations, thus sacrificing some of the benefits of textual uniformity. 2 8 It is no criticism of the federal rulesmakers to conclude that pressures unique to the federal courts have led to rules somewhat ambiguous in phrasing and subject to conflicting interpretations. A state, however, would do well to consider whether it is worthwhile to incorporate these same problems--or if it should seek phrasings that are more precise and better tailored to whatever policies the state wishes to follow.
II. RULE 14(a) IMPLEADER
Federal Rule 14(a) has always allowed a defendant to implead a third party who, as the rule now reads, "is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." The purpose of the rule is to permit economical settlement of claims for indemnity, such as those of an insured against his insurer, in the same proceeding that settles the primary liability and damages issues. The device is available in most state court systems; but even if the state rules differ, requiring a separate suit on the indemnity claim, the state's divergence from Fed- 
the indemnity determination without affecting the substantive law governing the claim. 9 There are, however, aspects of interpleader procedure that would raise unique problems in the federal ourts if incorporated into the Federal Rule. Consequently, the states can feel less constrained than the federal rulesmakers in certain respects.
A. Impleader of Third-Party Defendant Allegedly Liable Directly to Plaintiffi
As originally promulgated, Federal Rule 14(a) not only provided for impleader of parties who might be derivatively liable to the defendant if he were held liable on the plaintiffs claim, but also allowed the defendant to join a third-party defendant-such as a joint tortfeasorwho might be directly liable to the plaintiff on his claim against the defendant. 3 0 The rule was amended in 1946, effective in 1948, to eliminate this direct liability impleader and leave only the present derivative liability provision. 3 There were two main types of difficulty with direct liability impleader, but the reasons for its inappropriateness in the federal system need not apply to the states. First, the prevailing view was that under the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 2 which does not govern the state courts, a plaintiff could not, without independent jurisdictional grounds, proceed against a third-party defendant who shared state citizenship with the plaintiff 3 3 Second, federal direct liability impleader ran into a dilemma in state law cases when state law made no provision for contribution among joint tortfeasors. If direct liability impleader put the third party's liability to the plaintiff in issue whether the plaintiff had sought to do so or not, the original defendant might be given a right of contribution not available under state law. Such an effect would raise problems under the Rules Enabling Act, which forbids the Federal Rules to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 34 To avoid this difficulty, most of the federal courts that faced the issue interpreted the rule to mean that the plaintiff had no obligation to proceed against the new party. 35 approach, however, reduced direct liability impleader to "a mere offer of a party to the plaintiff," 3 6 eliminating the practical effect of the rule.
The states, by contrast, are free to decide whether they wish to allow one potential defendant to force the joinder of others through direct liability impleader. Some have done so, with language either identical in phrasing or equivalent in effect to the pre-1948 Federal Rule. 37 Other states should at least consider the possibility that the federal language took its present form for reasons that do not bind the states-and that it may not coincide completely with what they want to accomplish.
B. Compulsory Claims by Plaintiffs Against Third-Party Defendants.
The same sorts of problems would arise if Federal Rule 14(a) incorporated the approach adopted in some states on compulsory claims against impleaded defendants. The Federal Rule provides that after impleader of the third-party defendant, "[t]he plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff. .. ." This provision is entirely permissive, but some states' counterpart rules make it compulsory by adding, "and his failure to do so shall have the effect of the failure to state a claim in a pleading under Rule 13(a)." ' 38 Rule 13(a) governs compulsory counterclaims; under it, a defendant's related courterclaim is normally precluded if not raised in the same suit.
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Any similar federal rule is barred by the application of the Strawbridge complete diversity rule, which requires an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over a diversity plaintiffs claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant. 4 " If federal jurisdictional limits sometimes make it impossible for the plaintiff to join his claim, the Rules can hardly hold it against him if he fails to do so. In addition, a federal provision making such claims compulsory would run the risk of colliding with state substantive law allowing plaintiffs to proceed against joint tortfeasors individually. In states where the substantive law per-36. Id. 37. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(a) (defendant may join anyone "who may be alone liable or liable over to him" on the plaintiffs claim "or jointly or severally liable thereon with him"); TEx. R. Civ. P. 38 (defendant may implead nonparty "who is or may be liable to him or to theplainti(y for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against" him) (emphasis added; italicized phrase identical to language of pre-1948 federal provision).
38. ALA. R. Civ. P. 14(a); ME. R. Civ. P. 14(a); VT. R. Civ. P. 14(a mits, however, the rulesmakers are free to respond to the concern expressed by the reporter for the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure: "It seems an unfair burden upon the [third-party defendant] not to require the plaintiff to clean up in a single action the entire controversy arising out of a single transaction or occurrence." 4 1
III. AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS FOR JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT PURPOSES IN CLASS ACTIONS
In Snyder v. Harris, 42 the Supreme Court held that class action plaintiffs may not generally aggregate their claims to satisfy the minimum amount in controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction. 43 One of the reasons for the decison-and perhaps the most persuasive one-relates to a problem unique to federal diversity jurisdiction. In a diversity class action, only the citizenship of the named representatives counts; shared citizenship between unnamed class members and an adverse party does not destroy complete diversity.' If small claimants could pool their claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement, they could bring an essentially local controversy within federal jurisdiction by naming an out-of-stater as the class representative. 45 Thus, the class action rule 46 would create federal jurisdiction in this situation: without the rule no member of the plaintiff class-even the out-of-staters-would qualify for federal jurisdiction because of the smallness of his claim. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, are not intended "to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United States Some state courts also have amount in controversy requirements for their jurisdiction, normally to determine whether a case belongs in a superior or an inferior state court. 48 Because the subject matter jurisdiction of the state courts does not depend on the citizenship of the parties, however, and because there is no reason for concern about bringing an essentially local controversy within the jurisdiction of a local court, the rationale for the Snyder holding does not apply to state 41. Reporter's Notes to ME. R. Civ. P. 14, reprinted in 1 R. [ Vol. 1979:843 courts. In at least two opinions, though, state judges have shown a willingness to follow the Snyder rule, apparently without considering whether it really makes sense except on the federal level. 49 Fortunately, other state court treatments of the applicability of Snyder have perceived the federalist influence behind its holding and reached independent conclusions on its suitability at the state level. In particular, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that forbidding aggregation could effectively eliminate any forum for class actions involving multiple small claims, since inferior state courts are practically, or perhaps even legally, incompetent to handle such complex proceedings.
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However great the benefits of uniformity of interpretation generally, the aggregation problem demonstrates that state courts in arriving at interpretations under their rules, like state rulesmakers in settling on phrasings for the rules, should be alert for situations in which the federal interpretation is inappropriate for state purposes. In such cases state judges should strike off on their own.
IV. PREREQUISITES FOR STOCKHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
Federal Rule 23.1(1) requires that a complaint in a shareholder's derivative action allege "that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law." One function of the rule is to prevent the purchase and sale of federal diversity jurisdiction; without the requirement, transferring a share of a corporation's stock to a diverse party after the alleged injury to the corporation could permit suit in federal court. 5 1 This possibility is of no concern to state drafters in the framing of their counterpart rules, and if the federal provision accomplished nothing more, there would be no reason to consider including it in state rules.
The contemporaneous ownership requirement, though, does serve another purpose: it keeps a prospective litigant not only from buying federal jurisdiction but also from buying a lawsuit, period. The policy served here is one against litigation based on events that took place [Vol. 1979:843 when the plaintiff had no shareholder's stake in them. 5 " Whether that policy is worth serving, however, is a question on which reasonable states could differ. The federal requirement may prevent not only purchased lawsuits but also actions brought by innocent purchasers who suffer the effects of previous corporate conduct that comes to light after their purchase. 5 3 Some states' rulesmakers have left the contemporaneous ownership requirement out of their counterparts to Federal Rule 23. 1, 5 perhaps in some cases out of disapproval and in others on the theory that the policy decision is not one that should be made by rule. 5 Others, however, in omitting the requirement seem to have perceived only the federalist problem and to have missed the independent policy considerations, reversing the difficulty noted in previous sections of overlooking the federalist influence. In these states, the drafters' perception of the federal influence apparently blinded them to the generally applicable equitable basis for the requirement; 56 state rulesmakers aware of this independent reason for the rule might find it worth keeping.
V. DIRECTED VERDICT MOTION AS PREREQUISITE TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING VERDICT
A complicated constitutional evolution 57 led to the approach taken in Federal Rule 50(b), under which a jury verdict loser must have sought a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence in order to move for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). In brief, the Supreme Court first ruled that judgment n.o.v was unconstitutional in the federal courts, 5 s but then held that the seventh amendment did permit the reservation of a ruling on a directed verdict motion until after return of the verdict. 9 Capitalizing on this loophole, the drafters of the Federal Rules eliminated the necessity for actual reservations in individual cases, providing that "[w]henever a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion." 6 The result is a clear but fairly detailed set of requirements for preserving the right to seek judgment n.o.v., and from time to time counsel inevitably fall into the trap set by the rules' rigid demand.
Since the seventh amendment has never been held binding on the states, 6 ' they are free to avoid this trap for the unwary. Some states have chosen to take advantage of this constitutional elbow room. 62 They may have done so, however, at an unperceived cost, for-like the contemporaneous ownership requirement-the Federal Rule's minuet has independent functional value. As Professor Moore's treatise explains:
At the time that a motion for directed verdict is permitted, it remains possible for the party against whom the motion is directed to cure the defects in proof that might otherwise preclude him from taking the case to the jury. A motion for judgment n.o.v., without prior notice of alleged deficiencies of proof, comes too late for the possibility of cure except by way of a complete new trial. The requirement of the motion for directed verdict is thus in keeping with the spirit of the rules to avoid tactical victories at the expense of substantive interests.
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In other words, the directed verdict motion prerequisite makes it necessary for the moving party to point out any reparable gaps in his adversary's proof in time for them to be filled. Consequently, abandoning the requirement can substitute another sort of trap for the unwary: the movant for judgment n.o.v. can lie low with his objection until his adversary is no longer able to do anything about it, though with earlier notice the opponent might have remedied the defect. There is no direct indication that the state rulesmakers who decided to omit the federal prerequisite considered it in a balanced light, taking into account both its costs and benefits apart from the uniquely federal constitutional problem that helped shape the present Federal Rule. 6 4 Once again, state drafters may have been all too aware of the federalism of a Federal Rule-to the exclusion of nonfederalist purposes it also serves.
VI. CONCLUSION
This brief survey does not purport to be exhaustive; no doubt there are other instances of federalist influence on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and varying responses in states adopting federal-model rules. 65 Nor do I claim to have isolated any single type of federalist influence on the Federal Rules, nor to have described any dominant pattern in the states' adaptation of those rules. At times the federalist influence shows in the phrasing of a Federal Rule, as with Rule 3 on "commencement" of an action. At other times it shows in the omission of a provision that the states can more readily adopt, such as a defendant's impleader of a third party who may be directly liable to the plaintiff. At still other times the effect is on decisional law under a rule, as in the case of aggregation of claims in class actions.
As for the nature of the states' responses, there is little uniformity beyond the nearly universal avoidance of slavish incorporation of [Vol. 1979:843 clearly inappropriate provisions. Some states have deliberately chosen a high degree of congruence with the Federal Rules for convenience, simplicity, and interchangeability of precedent, but some state rulesmakers have apparently followed the Federal Rules unquestioningly, particularly with regard. to Rules 3 and 15(c) as they relate to statutes of limitations. When the states do depart from the federal model, some display great sensitivity to the reasons underlying the Federal Rules and to why state approaches might well differ. Others, particularly with respect to the contemporaneous ownership rule in stockholder derivative actions and the directed verdict motion prerequisite to seeking judgment n.o.v., may have overreacted to their correct perception of federalist influence and missed the general value of the approaches followed in the Federal Rules. To avoid both excessive tracking of and questionable departures from federal phrasing, state rulesmakers must consider carefully the thinking behind the Federal Rules, what they accomplish, and whether that suits the state's purposes.
This Comment may, I hope, help state rulesmakers in this endeavor by providing several illustrations of federalist influence and state responses, including some responses that seem very thoughtful and others that appear less so. What could help even more is something that has been conspicuously lacking throughout the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: specific mention in federal Advisory Committee Notes of the uniquely federal policies behind the approaches taken in some of the Federal Rules. State rulesmakers might benefit greatly from such comments, as well as from an explanation of generally applicable functional considerations when mixed with federalist influences. The pattern of state adoption of both the general federal model and, often, of specific federal amendments is now widespread and well established. The federal rulesmakers are in the best position to recognize when concerns applicable to the federal system, but less so or not at all in the states, influence their product; they should recognize an obligation to provide the information that would help the states make fully informed decisions on just how closely to follow the federal model.
